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1.  The Council of 29 November 1994 ·concluded that "further discussion is necessary 
on how to open the markets beyond the area ·of electricity production,.especially on 
the question of the possible simultaneous introduction of a negotiated TPA and  a 
so-called single-buyer system.  -ln,·this  context,  it is  necessary to verify that both 
approaches, in  the spirit of reciprocity,  lead  to  equivalent economic results and, 
therefore, to a directly comparable level in the opening of markets and to a directly 
comparable degree of access to electricity markets and -that they conform with the 
- provisions of the Treaty.  The Commission is called on to examine and outline the · 
anticipated consequences of the side-by-side application  of both  approaches,  in· 
particular with respect to the potential for competition and the impact o_n the various 
groups of suppliers and purchasers"<1l_ 
2.  Furthermore, the Council wanted to be informed whether with regard to tendering. 
procedures  for  new production  capacity,  which  form  part  of the  organisational 
structure of single  buyer systems  for .example,  specific types  of new electricity 
production need to be authorised  in  parallel to the tender procedure.  Finally the 
impact of negotiated third party access and so-called single buyer systems on small 
and very small Community electricity systems should be analysed. 
3.  This working  paper  of the  Commission  addresses  the  above-mentioned  study 
requests and presents the respective findings and evaluations of the Commission. 
This working paper does not repeat in detail the : 
working definitions of a negotiated TPA and  Single Buyer system, 
results  concerning  competition  potentials  for  producers  and  consumers  of 
electricity under both systems, 
the detailed description of authorisation and tender procedures, 
The Council conclusions of 29.  November 1994 are contained in Annex I 
3 which are contained in the study made at the request of the European Commission. 
by the. "Energiewirtschaftliches lnstitut" at the University of Cologne on  : ·"TPA and 
single ~uyer systems; producers and parallel _authorisations;  small and_ very small 
systems''··· 
4.  However this working paper highlights the main differences between th€1 n.egotiated 
TPA~and Single Buyer sy~tem in terms of: 
;..  - opening of and access to electricity markets, 
enforcement  of  public  service  obligations  to  achieve  services  of  general 
economic interest,- especially to guarantee security of supply,  : 
realisation of an internal electricity market, in which transborder electricity flows . 
are not restricted in  an  unjustified manner, 
res·pect of the legal provisions of the Treaty. 
5.  -Part one of this working paper  on the simultaneous introduction of negotiated TPA 
and  Single Buyer systems is structured· as follows : 
description of negotiated TPA ~nd Single Buyer sy~tems, 
comparis.on between the internal  organisatio~ of the systems, 
negotiation .of contr~cts, 
single buyer's behaviour, 
direct lines, 
- ··  competition and  investments, 
C\ 
legal analysis 
Part two addresses the subject of parallel capacity authorisations within tendering 
systems. 
Both parts of this working paper focus exclusively on electricity systems based on  .  .  .  . 
negotiated Tf'A and Single Buyer system elements. 
•  - >  l  .  . 
A second working paper will follow later which will contain part three of  th~ Council's 
request to the Commission, and which will cover the issue of  small and very small 
- . 
4 electricity systems. 
I 
6.  In, presenting: its findings·the-Cornmission .has  taken  iRto  account the comments 
presented by Member States·as well.as·the argurnents.submitted by the European 
Electricity  Industry  (EURELECTRI.C),  the  Community's  big  industrial.  energy 
consumers. (IFIEC), the Community's independentele_ctricity distributors (GEODE) 
-· 
as well as. by other small and medium-sized consumers (BEUC). 
EXECUTIVE. SUMMARY 
7.  .Th~. Single  Buyer  (SB)  system, ·-as  proposed  in  its  present  form,  cannot  be 
considered  as being  economically  equivalent  to  the  Commission's  proposal  of· 
negotiated  Third Party Access  (TPA)  as  it falls  short  of what  is  desirable  and 
achievable from  a  competition  point  of view;  reciprocity  can  only  be  assured 
between the systems if certain  basic adaptations are applied to  the present SB-
model. Both systems must be based on a common and transparent definition as 
regards categories of  eligible consumers. The opening of the market is realised via 
the coverage of these eligible consumers. 
8.  As regards the simultaneous introduction of both  systems and their compatibility 
with the Treaty, it can be concluded that the SB system~ as provided in its present 
form  with  its  internal monopoly structure,  is  to  be  considered  as a  measure of 
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on  imports  within the sense of article 
30 of the EC Treaty.  Furthermore, it should not contain obstacles to the freedom 
of este3blishment going beyond constraints imposed by public security. 
The present proposal would result in  all supplies and production being channeled 
de facto through the Single Buyer.  A system which channels imports and exports 
through an  intermediary. is  contrary to  the  pr;inciple  of free movement of goods. 
Exclusive· rights  resulting  in  absolute  control  over  imports,  transmission  and 
5 ~· 
( 
distribution  are  prima  facie  contrary· to  the  basic  Community  principle ·of free 
movement and competition and cannot be automatically justified on public services 
'  . 
'  .  - . 
grounds, t:>ut need to be analysed ca.se by case  to ensure respect of the principle 
.. of proportionality. 
Security  of supply reasons could justify an exemption based on  "public security" 
·provided in  article 36 of the Treaty.  There is  no evidence in the case law of the 
'  '  .  .  ·-
Court leading to an automatic suspension of the Treaty rules on free movement and 
competition.  ~s  the negotiated TPA-system shows,  security of supply and public 
service obligations can  be met in  a system more  open  .to competition: 
.It is obvious that according to the respective security of supply situations Member 
States organise electricity markets  ac~ording to their differentneeds. The Single 
.: Buyer ·system wants to provide an organisation· of the electricity market based on 
- '  - .  '  ' 
-.  - . 
long terr:n system planning aiming at securing supply with a central management of 
production, transport and distribution.  Without  affe~ting the goal of this long term 
planning.  a~d security ·of  SUP. ply  adapt~tions  of the  Single .  Buyer  system  are. 
necessary to ensure  ,compatability with the Treaty and for  rea~ons of economic. 
equivalence. 
·.g.  To ensure·a maximum of reciprocity and compatibility with the Treaty, tt)e foll6wing 
modalities have to be met : 
Degree of  consumer choice for eligible consumers  : In  cas~~ of  the SB system 
eligible .consumers should have the freedom to  contract eleCtricity supplies' 
I  . 
't'ith .  external  producers  under the  same  conditions  as  and  with .  domestic 
independent ele~tricity producers. 
.  .  . 
Imports  and  exports  of electricity  :  Both  systems  could  generate  directly 
.  . 
. comparable and acceptable results if the import regime under the  S~-model 
·is governed by an obligation of the SB to. buy unlimited quantities of imported 
electricity under certain objective conditions, by transparency of  tariffs to use 
6 the transmission system and thereby transparency of prices to be paid by the 
Single iBuyer for imported electricity.  Furthermore,, ;electricity imports should 
only;tlesubject to objective and justified conditions (i.e. :lack ofi~terconnected 
capaeity :or for  public security reasons). 
Transparency  and  distortion  of competition  :In  order  to  ensure  that  the 
princ~p1es ·of objectivity, transparency and non-discrimination are respected, 
to guarantee that  competition is not. distorted,  to avoid the -risk of potential 
·,  discriimirnation, and to achieve neutral and independent treatment, the Single 
Buyer, ;where part of an integrated undertaking, should be fully unbundled in · 
terms ·of ;a .full separation of management and  of information flows between 
its differernt activities, especially in  terms of production and supply. 
Competition at the ·level of production  : Tendering procedures for new and 
additional production  capacities,  whicM .are :more  restrictive  in  competition 
terms than authorisation systems, should only be .organised and .decided by 
public authorities or other independent -entities appointed for -this jpur:pose.  . 
ParaUel authorisations of Independent Pr<:>ducers: To redress the:imbalance 
between authorisation and tender procedures, independent producers should,_ 
even  under  tendering  systems,  benefit  from  :parallel  authorisations  to 
strengthen  competitive  forces.  A  transparent  definition  for  independent 
producers  in. SB-systems must be  introduced,  on  the  basis of quantitative 
capacity -tnresholds.  In addition, autoproducers, export-producers and RWC 
producers  (renewable,  waste,  CHP) ·should  also  benefit  from  ·parallel 
authorisations -to fulfil the need for their specific type of production capacity. 
Direct lines: In the Single Buyer system all eligible consumers shall have the 
freedom  to  construct  and  use  direct Jines  for  transactions  with •external 
producers and domestic·independent producers·(and vice versa for  producers 
to  supply  eligible  consumers)  within  -the  framework  of Art.7  of the  draft 
modified Directive. 
7 Part I  Simultaneous introduction of_ the TPA and'  SB sys~em 
I.  DESCRIPTION OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS. 
1  0;  The. comparison  of the ·two .  systems should  take  into  account  not  only  the 
A. 
11' 
,.(  -.  .  '  .  '  .  '  '  .  '  ' 
- functioning of the two systems themselves,  but also the context 'in  which they 
'  .  ~  .  '  . 
- wquld function both aHJ1e level of the organisation of the production and at the · 
. ..  .  ~  - . .  '  .  .  .  '  . 
·  l~vel of the definition of the eligible consumers for acce~s to the network. 
The single buyer and negotiated TPA 
i  .  '•  J 
.  The o.bjective of the Ccm~mission's negotiated TPA-proposal· is to open electricity 
markets and to s_trengthen competitive-forces within historically grown, closed and 
I  •  •·  ,_ 
monopoly.,oriented electricity systems,. without jeopardizing the fulfilment of public  ' 
servic~obligations,·especially.the security.of electricity systems. According to Its 
p:romoters, the SB-proposal ~ims  at a safeguard of  servic~s of general economiC? -
int~rests -via  the ·  trans·parent,  non-discriminatorY  imposition- of public. service.--
.  ~bligations and at loniHerm system planning while at the same time- intr~ducing ·-:-·  :  .  .  .  .  .  -.  . 
competitive rorces at the levef of production and, to some extent; at consu-mption  > 
level.  . ·  .. 
· 12.  In  general, within a TPA-systE!m eligible electricity consumers h~v~  the choice to_  -
find. insige  o'r  outside th_eir. electricity  system .the  most competitive  ele~tricity 
producers; to negotiate suppiy contracts with  them while  negotiating. with  the .  ·_ 
·  \'  .  system operator(s) the re~pective  contracts for use of  the transmission/distribution 
'  . 
· . systems to execute the supply contracts agreed upon. According to the Directive 
· ~ropos~d.  by the Commission the.  conclu~ion ·of  c~ntracts to .use the transport . 
. .  .  '  .  .  .  ~ 
sy~tem can only be ·refused .because of mainly objective elements,  like lack of 
.  .  .  .  .  .  '  . 
't~ansmissiori capacity or the fulfilment of public ·service obligations. However, in  . 
practice th~re is also the danger that th~ systemoperatdr, possibly b-eing  p~rt of 
I  •  '  '  '  '  •  ',  '  ~  ' 
an integrated ·~ompany, may abuse his dominant  position. This ·risk can only be 
·--




13.  The general rule is that the Single Buyer will  pur~hase  electricity accordin~:fto an 
·economic merit order from.producers under contract with the Single Buyer.  The  ..  .  , 
Single Buyer will be'  obliged to optimise the price of its purchases from producers, 
so as to provide the lowest possible sales,price to its co'nsurners.  In case of ttw 
Single  Buyer .system  it  caR  be  generally  stated  that  any  direct negotiation 
between  eligible  consumers  and  producers  is  an  .  exemption  within . the 
organisational  structure,.  ·The .exemptions  are  foreseen  only  for  transborder 
transactions but noUor transactions inside the system of the Single Buyer  . .Even 
in  cases where eligible ·consumers can  shop .around·to find  more competitive 
external electricity suppliers, this electricity can only be sold to the Single Buyer 
to  integ~ate it into the .internal electricity system.  ~owever, the eligible consumer 
may  ben~fit from. these  contracts  if the  co11ditions  for  the  sales  negotiations 
between eligible consumers and the Single Buyer are properly set. 
Transparency would be fully assured as the Single Buyer would  be obliged to 
purchase the external electricity at a price be'ing the original sales price between 
the eligible consumer and the Single B~yer  minus the published tariff for the use 
of the transmission system.  The  Single  Buyer· may  refuse  to  buy  back  the 
electricity of an external supplier only because of objective reasons like a lack of. 
transmission capacity or public security. As  in the case of negotiated TPA, the 
Single Buyer ·has the possibility to abuse its dominant position and to favour the 
production  or  distribution 'interests  of its .  own  vertically integrated  company. 
Appropriate control mechanisms and other structural precautions are, therefore, 
a precondition for the proper functioning of the system. 
14.  In  both cases,  the eligible consumer gets  an  advantage through the choice of 
electricity supplier; in both cases the freedom of negotiation is  assured, provided 
that when there are links with  production  (integrated  u·ndertaking),  guarantees 
exist that the transporter can  not let its  interests  as  producer prevail  over its 
obligations as transporter. 
9 . However,  ~veri .though  the  negotiated  .. TPA  system ·is  ·as  open  to  national 
producers as it isto those of other Member States and thus intr~duces.an internal 
.  - j,  ..  .  ·.  '  '  .  .  - .  .  - .  .  .  - ' 
liberalisation of  the market, the ·si1_1gle buy~r  system does not permit ari equivalent 
.  - opening  of internal' exchanges in  the territori.covered by the single buyer as . 
I  .  ,  .  .  .  ,  .  .  - . 
compared  to  imports/exports:  Inside.  its  system  the Sing  I~ .Buyer  holds. a ·  · 
purchase  and  saies  monopoly  for. eleCtricity.  one·  can  conside-r  ttiat  such  a 
si~uation  constitutes  a factor  of discrimination' in  revers~. but one  can  also 
j  .·._  •  ,..  .  •  '  ,-_  .  •  ' 
consider that  by letting a different organisation of  the market continue to,exist, this 
. c~n result in. a distortion of competition. 
.  .  '  . 
15.  The effects'  of the resale ·of imports by eligible consumers to the Single Buyer in 
t~rms of  competition. will,depenci on the price- l~vels that exist in the. Single B.uyer 
.;;  .  - '  ~  .  .  -
system and in -the ne_ighbouring systems.  On the one hand the Single Buyer  will 
I  .  .  :·  .  .  .  - br· under the obligation  to optimise  its  sales  pri~es to  consumers.- However, 
Member States. might want to  follow pricing 'policies ·for specific  categ~ries of 
.  .  i  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
consumers.  On the other hand the number.of_imports offered to the SingleBuyer 
.·  .  I  -
· and  their  size  in. terms  of electricity,  will  be  Important  in  determining  the 
.  .  .  '  .: 
.  · c(;>mpetitiye effect within the Single Buyer system.  Competitive import prices will 
force the Single Buyer to· .offer more· compet.itive  price~ to consumers. 
8.- >:·'  Systems of access to the network and organisation of production .: 
I  .  . .  . 
16.  .·Both, the negotiated third party access and the Single. Buye!r system introduce · 
competition' at the. level of electricity production. The amended  proposal ofthe 
- .  .  '.,  .  .,.  - \ 
_Commission introduced, with ttw formula of negotiated access by third parties to 
·  ·tllle network, the choice be_tween the authori$ation procedure (original proposal) 
I  .  .  ..  • 
. : a'nd the tendering procedure (ameridm~nt.  by  Parliament)· for the  co_nstruction  .· 
1  •  •  •  •  •  •  r 
of new.  'production  capacity ::- ' 
-~  the authorisation regime gives the initiative to the producer .which_ wants }o 
ppen ~P n~wproductioncapacity; the  p~6posa1 for aDirectiv~ lays down the  . 
,10 
- I 
........ reasons for the refusal of an authoris-ation.  These authorisations are issued 
·by the.regu~atory authority. The authorisation procedure exposes all new and 
existing production facilities to competition;  .  , ·. 
the tendering  regime gives the initiative to the regulatory authority when  it 
considers that the derriand .  can no longer be satisfied by the existing capacity 
in its territory. The tender only covers new additional capacity needs; already 
.  .  . 
existing capacity will not be exposed-to competition.  These calls for ten~er . 
should  also be open to. the benefit of existing capacities  in  other Member 
States.  This method of tendering should permit States, which so choose, to 
give  preference  to  certain  fuels:· in  comparison  with  others,  for  reasons 
especially of protection of the environment or security of supply.  The national 
producers or those of· another Member State must,  therefore,  wait for the 
launching of a call ~for tender for considering· their establishment in  another 
Member State. The tendering regime would include the possibility to integrate 
energy efficiency options in  the bidding process (for example in the form of. 
lnteg'rated Resource Planning). 
It  is  clear that the  level  of exposure  to  competition  will  be  greater under an 
authorisation procedure than  under a tendering procedure. 
17.  Although differences-and imbalances in terms of competition exist betwee11 both 
systems, it needs to _be  underlined that these differences are part of the syst~m 
approach chosen. Long -term  planning, forming par:t of the Single Buyer system, 
would  be technically difficult with a totally free authorisation procedure. However 
some of these imbalances can be reduced through the introduction of elements 
of the authorisation procedure into the call for tender system (see part two of this 
working paper).  In  the long term,  even  in  the tendering  system  all  production. 
facilities will successively have been exposed to competition.  Furthermore, the 
free initiative permitted by the authorisation regime has to take into account the 
risks associated to these investments. There are no secured outlets for these new 
production facilities. 
11 c  .  Systems of.acc~ss to the networ~  and eligible consumers · 
.  .  ·18.  . The Single Buyer system as generally perceived from the start (French proposal) 
·did riot _include  dis!ributo~s. among· the  eligible .consumers. · As such  it would 
. constitute a measure of equival~nt effect to a qiJantitative restriction on imports 
. within  t~e sense of article 30 of  the Treaty  . .It since appear~d that the exclusio~  - - .  - .  .  '  ' 
.  a( distributors was not intrinsic to the Single Buye·r system. The pre~ent  workin-g. 
paper  therefore assumes that the definition of eligible consumers is the same in 
.  -·.  .  .  -.  . 
· both systems, L  ~- large industrial consumers and distributors,  in ·line with the  · 
:  I  .  -- - .  .  .  -
logic of the Commissic;m's proposal. As it has been underlined in  it~ proposal, the 
. ~  .  .  ,.  .  .  .  . .  .  "'  .  :. 
'pbssibility -of·. access  to. 'the  network  for  distributors  should  allow 'captive  ' 
consumers (dpmestic consumers) to  benefit indirectly from the least expensive  - ..  :  '  .  '  .  .  .  . . 
:electriCity in the Community aJ1d should espeCially shelter them from the tendency· · 
\.Vh-ich the pr~ducers could have. to cross-subsidize large i~dustrial consumers to 
the detriment of distributors and domestic consumers.· As qomestic consumers 
'  . 
· can  only  indirectly  ben~fit from  competition  it  is  not  possible to  establis~ an . 
' 
assessment  of  price.  developments , or  economic  benefits.  However,  the · 
advantages  for  small  con_sumers 'seem  to.  be  higher  under  the·  system' of 
r·  ;  .  .  ~  .  .  •  ~ 
Megotiated TPA as the freedom of choice for distributors is better than in the case 
. 
qf  the  .$ingle  Buyer  system .. For  captive  consumers,  regulation. will  still  be 
. Mecessary .to ensure fair  pii~ing and a-bsence  otcr~ss-subsidies.  .  - .. 
t9:  ·  -,  Under the Sing_le Buyer system, the ppssibil!ty ·of shopping around also given to 
~"'  I  '  ' 
distributors_ will  increase the  competitive  -pressur~ on  the  Single  Buyer.  The 
op'ening  o·f  the· network  to  distributors. is-,  therefore,_  part  of the  objective  to 
~~inforce  .the  gen~ral efficiepcy ·of.the  elect~icity systems, to the benefit of the. 
l  .  .  •  -
yompetitiveness of not  only the  large torisumers,_ but ~lso of the SME's andth~, 
servic~ companies connected to the'  network of the distributor. 
20.  -However,  although the definition. of eligible consumers_ is the same under both  _  . 
12 -.. D. 
systems, it should not be forgotten that under the negotiat~d TPA system, eligi_ble 
consumers are free to shop around inside and outside the system of the network 
operator whereas under the Single Buyer proposal.eligible consumers would only 
be allowed to find more competitive suppliers outside the.electricity system.  -
Systems of access to the network and the structure of production 
··  21.  One must, however, admit that whatever the· choice is on· access to·the network, 
_ its effeCt ca·n only be considered as a progress (without prejudging whether this 
.  . 
progress is  sufficient in the context of an  internal electricity market) taking into· 
account ·the .dimension ofthe investments and their 'lifespan.  This is in particular 
true  in  the  markets  where  there  are  overcapacities  linked  to  long-term 
investments like for example nuclear energy  in France. In the case of France 'the 
need for new capacity will not appear before the year 2000 and  consequently, 
·whatever the choice of access  regime  is,  no  call  for tender will  be  launched 
. before this date expires. 
E.  Systems of access to the network and the structure of the systems 
22.  The more the options multiply themselves, the more it will be possible to give to 
Member States the possibility.notjust to adapt their organisation and the structure 
of the companies to the Directive, but to adapt the application of the Directive to 
their organisation and to their structure.  This approach, therefore; tends towards · 
subsidiarity, but does not follc;>w the path of integration of electricity systems in as 
far as the only flexibilities to he introduced as compared with the present situation  .  .  . 
shall be at the level of the right of establishment and free movement.  Every effort 
should, therefore, bear upon the preservation of equal chances for operators in 
markets other than their own domestic markets (prohibition of discrimination and 
,of  import/export ·monopolies)  and  the  safeguarding  of  fair  conditions  of 
competition. 
13 
.  \ 'F.  System of access to network and geographical organisation 
23.  The more fragmented the organis~tional structures are and  the more separated 
electricity systems  are  in .a  geographical  area  the  more  complex the  access 
•  -- .  .  - .  .  ,  .  r-- - .  . 
negotiations will be because the electricity will have to transit through different 
areas  before reaching  the  consumer. · The choice  of netWork  access  Will  not 
change this physical obstacle.  -
I 
II.  ~COMPARISON BETWEEN  THE  INTERNAL. ORGANISATION  OF  THE 
. SYSTEMS. 
24.  The two systems are based on differentmethods  offunctionin~ and organisation. 
This situatiqn can lead to a distortion of· competition as regards·the structure ·of  .  .  ',  .  .  .  . 
the undertakings or as  .. regards the choice .of organisation of production.· 
A.  The question of vertically integrated companies 
25.  To address the situation of integrated .structures,  rules for separation of  accounts 
.  .  .  . 
· betWeen th~  three activitie~ and; obligations in particular for the netwqrk operator, 
'  have_ been proposed by the Commission. 
26'.  Whe~  these kind of structures act within the context of a TPA regime; they should 
·accept that their production activities will be exposed, also in the national market, 
to competition by independent producers w~ich use the network of  the.integrated 
~company  ·to  directly supply electricity to consumers.  In  such· a  situation,  the  . 
.  . ~ .  '  . 
integrated  undertaking.,  be it  a public or a private one,  shall  have to adopt a 
I  competitive  behaviour -and  a· market strategy.  Contrary to this,· a single buyer-
·  · .  which also might have produCtion responsibilities, shall be sheltered within its own 
I. 
14 market from  competition. on  the  one  hand  because  the  opening  up  of new 
production c~pacity  depends on a call for tender, and on the other hand because 
even if independent capacity does exist,  it shall have to sell its electricity to the 
Single Buyer.  This situation  can  lead  the  Single  Buyer to  develop  predatory 
strategies  in  other markets.  However,  it  is  possible  to  limit  the  risks  of such 
behaviour: 
by  enlarging in the case of the Single Buyer system the parallel authorisation 
procedure, which in the proposed Directive is reserved to all autoproducers 
and independent producers; 
by enlarging the facilities of network access to the buying of  electricity from 
domestic producers.  The role played by the Single Buyer should ensure the 
safe operation of the system because it would intervene in the same manner 
as for import transactions. 
27  ..  The risks of disequilibrium can also appear in a Member State which choses for a 
TPAsystem.  Whatever the· conditions for negotiation offered to the consumer,. they 
risk to remain ineffectual if the eligible consumer or the producer has to enter into' 
· negotiation. with a succession of transport networks in the national territory to gain 
access to an  independent producer. 
B.  . Consequences of the choice of the procedure at production level 
28.  The choice ofthe production regime can also influence the equilibrium between· the· 
systems.  The recourse to a call for tender system means that the producer from 
another Member State shall have to· wait for the launching of a call for tender to be 
able to establish himself in the Single Buyer's area and under the condition that he 
wins the call for tender.  In a reversed way,  the producer can at any moment ask 
for an authorisation to establish production capacity close to an eligible consumer. 
15 Applying for an authorisation does not mean that  it will be granted; a refusal can, . 
- -
. _on  the  basis  of  the  proposed  Directiv~. be  given  especially for  reasons  of the 
protection of the environment. 
(  .. 
•J 
29.  Although the risk ofdisequilibrium at the level of  production may exist in a system 
of negotiated TPA  and  a Single Buyer system,  it exists as soon as one of them 
chooses for a tendering system.  Certainly, the  propo~al of the Commission opens 
up_~his possibility for the TPA regime, but it is-probable that a Member State which 
chooses the' tendering system will  e~lso choose the  Single. Buyer system  - if this 
possibility is given by the Directive - because- it responds to the same  con~ern of 
the planning of the system. 
30.  It:  is, therefore, necessary that a Sing  I~ Buyer system associated· with a tendering 
system is accompanied by a series. of precautions  •: 
- as within the framework of negotiated TPA the initiative for the call for tender-and 
the .  procedure-for  judging  the  calls  for  tender  sho~ld  provide  a·  maximum 
guarantee for objectivity and should, therefore, be placed-under the responsibility 
of an .entity independent from  the Single Buyer, whether this be the regulatory 
.  .  - . 
authority or an ad  hoc body; 
- -
- ·-·moreover, as the export of electricity in the absence of an authorisation procedure 
.  .....  . 
and,  while .awaiting a call for tender,_ is the only way  open to a producer from 
anotlier Member State, exchanges of electricity shall  have to be  made easier  . 
. Since the electricity is absorbed by  the_ network from its arrival in the territory of 
·the Single Buyer, the transport tariff must be applied without con~idera.tion·ofthe 
·distance between the producer and the consumer.  .  .  . 
Ill.  THE NEGOTIATION OF THE CONTRACTS 
31.  Even  when  the  contractual  modalities  cannot  be  the  same  between· the  two 
16 systems,  it is  necessary that in  both the negotiations take place under the same 
conditions of freedom  and  confidentiality.  This element is  important so  that the 
obligatory intervention by the Single Buyer is not considered as the exercise of an 
import/export monopoly. 
32.  The  confidentiality of the price of electricity bought by a consumer from  another 
producer than the utility on  which  it  depends must be  preserved  in  any system. 
Nevertheless, this is still more necessary in the case where a consumer sells back 
to the Single Buyer-the electricity contracted with another producer. 
33.  The transparency of transport tariffs shall be required where the network is part of 
an  integrated  company,  whatever system  is  chosen.  In  the  case  of the  Single 
Buyer  the  transparency  entails  the  publication  of tariff  rates  which  allow  the 
consumer to negotiate the sales contract while knowing the conditions for transport 
and while integrating the tariff in the negotiation of the price.  These tariffs should 
be able to be applied for the domest~c consumption, considering that by definition, 
because of the Single Buyer system, they will be  independent of the distance. 
34.  The freedom to negotiate shall also bear upon the quantities.  In the Single Buyer 
system the electricity is absorbed in case of imports by the network. It is, therefore, 
conceivable that the consumer could negotiate more electricity than  its needs; the 
Single Buyer should have to accept these quantities if the conditions are satisfied 
(disposal of transport capacity,  public security) and should have to do so against 
payment of the price it would normally also offer for imports.  This price would be 
the price paid by the consumer to the Single Buyer for supplies by the Single Buyer, 
minus  the  transport  tariff.  Such  a  provision  would  introduce  a  supplementary 
flexibility in the Single Buyer system and the Single Buyer model should therefore 
be governed  by an  obligation  of the Single· Buyer to buy  unlimited quantities of 
imported electricity under certain objective conditions. 
17 35.  Other conditions of the contract 
' 
According to the  promoters of the Single  Buyer .concept the external electricity  _ 
contracted. by eligible  con~umers  could  only  be  sold  to  th~ ·single  Buyer and 
. i'ntegrated into his long term system planning if_this electriGi-tY·is purchased by the  -
f3ligible-consumer on the basis of a long term supply contract: However, it would 
) 
;be nearly impossible to set the duration of these contracts in  advance,· as they 
· 9~mnot be  dissociated  from  quantities,  the  quality,  timing  and  the  o~igin of the· 
supply.  It would be discriminatory and; therefore, contrary to  article 30,_ if  ~ifferent 
ponditions  of duration  were  imposed on  transborder  -contracts  and  domestic 
contracts for the same categories of consumers.  Such ·a discrimination would be 
·_even  more unjustified in the case of the Single Buyer, since it has the necessary 
,instruments to manage the possible risks.  Furthermore it is not evident t~at so'me 
- ,  I 
l_imited  short or mid-term supplies could  n~t be integrated -into· long term  system 
planning.  Therefore, the duration of import contract~ by eligible consumers cannot 
-be  limited to only long term supply contracts.  The duration of the contracts will 
depend on the quantity, quality, timing and  origin of the supplies. 
....  ~  -
There is no apparent difference in finan.cial t~rms  forth~ big industrial customer, as 
long as transport charges are transparent, a purChC;)Se obligation of  the Single Buyer 
exists arid  the contract conditions  between. the big  indt,~strial consumer and  the _ 
exter_nal supplier remains confidential. Big industrial consumers may even prefer the 
system of  financi~l compensation .under the Single Buyer proposal as it guarantees -
.  .  . 
a  higher  degree  of  transparen~y  and  ·  avo.ids  possibly  complicated  access 
negotiations. The price for the external electricity contracted and to be paid by the 
single. Buyer would  be  th.e  original  electricity- price agreed  between the eligible 
. ·consumer  and  the  Single· Buyer  minus  the  published  -tariff  for. use  of  the 
transmission system. 
However,  wherea~ under the negotiated  TPA proposal  supply contracts can  be 
. concluded anq executed betWeen big industrial customers -and external suppliers, 
th~ s_ame is not true for the Single Buyer proposaL Under the latter proposal the big 
18 industrial consumer will always be forced to sell the external electricity to the Single 
Buyer which will integrate it into its own system. The eligible consumer under the 
TPA proposal will be responsible vis a  vis the electricity supplier chosen with regard 
to the whole lifetime of the contract. Under the Single Buyer system the duration of 
this responsibility will be more limited, because normally it will stop to exist after the 
eligible consumer has sold the electricity to the Single Buyer and after the external 
supplier has been paid for the electtricity contracted. 
I 
IV.  SINGLE BUYER'S BEHAVIOUR 
36.  The risk of distortion of competition
1can come-from the opacity of the functioning of 
the single buyer when  it exercises! responsibilities at the  level  of production.  An 
integrated company shall indeed bi  in a dominating  position, whatever the system. 
Nevertheless,  characteristics  of  t~e Single Buyer system reinforce this position : 
- As already mentioned, an  integra,ted company in a TPA system works in a more 
competitive  environment  in  so  far  as  TPA  applies  also  to  relations  between 
independent  producers  and  consumers  within  its  area,  under  the  control  of 
national competition authorities.  'In the Single Buyer system, there are no such 
relations but a sales monopoly. 
- In  addition,  there  is  in  the  end: a  cumulation  of responsibilities  and  powers . 
conferred  to  the  Single  Buyer,  as  regards  planing  of needs  and  resources, 
development, maintenance and operation of the network (including dispatching), 
buying and selling electricity destined to consumers in  its area, which makes it 
necessary to impose supplementary modalities in order to prevent anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
An inherent risk of  distortions of intra-Community trade and competition, arising from 
a possible behaviour of the Single Buyer, could lead to predatory pricing. Although 
this  is  a  problem  arising from  the  general  combination  of a vertically-integrated 
19 .  . 
company with the regime bftendering, there are factors ~hich  reinforce this risk in. 
the presen't Single  Buyer  syste~. The  risk  of predatory pricing  arises ..from  the 
cumulation .of responsibilities and powers conferred to the Single Buyer. This· leads 
. -to an overall"opacity" of the functioning of the Single  .. Buyer.  when it exercises its 
system·obligations ~nd the other  responsibilities at the level of production. 
.  . 
As already mentioned, an  integrated company in  a TPA system works in  a more 
.  .  .  .  . 
competitive  environment  in  so. far  as .  TPA  applies  also  to' relations  between 
independent  -producers  and  consumers ·within · its  area.  -Under  these  direct 
n~gotiations producers will seek to obtain the most favourable price for their output-
at least, they will seek to recoup their-costs and are therefore unlikely to be able 
td trade in electricity at prices which do not cover costs over .anything but the very 
short-run. 
The Single Buyer, under the obligation to purchase all electricity produced within. the  .  .  . 
system and coming from imports by eligible consumers, may be in a position where 
· he could consider  to sell or exp9rt a possible surplus  from the purchase obligations 
· at a very low price. 
However,  it should  generally no.t  be  in· the  interest of the  Single  Buyer to  sell 
electricity below purchase prices. Regarding his purchase.·obli.gationsthere is the 
possibilitiy  not to  accept a  physical  delivery  but  to.· negotiate  a  stand-by  price . 
instead.· 
Nevertheless, ·there  is ·the  necessity  of  national  regulation  and  competition 
authorities to supervise the market behaviour of.the Singel Buyer. With regard to 
both systems, dispute settlement mechanisms, as laid down in the modified draft 
Directive· are  therefore  applicable  to  all  aspects  of both  systems,.  Publil?hed 
electricity prices would facilitate this task. 
37.  Consequently, the setting up ·of the single buyer system must be accompanied by· 
a number of measures designed to guarantee non-discriminatory treatment of the 
20  ' other users of the network, and to reduce the risk of a distortion of competition 
because of the coexistence of two different systems : 
- The single buyer activities must be monitored by a regulation authority which has 
the power to intervene at any moment to ensure that the decisions of the single 
buyer are compatible with Community law; 
As already provided by the Commission's proposal, the responsibility .of the call 
for tender· must be· outside the group of the Single Buyer in  order especially to 
avoid that it will favour the choice of fuels according to its own industrial interest 
and not according to the public interest and to protect the commercial secrets of 
the applicants in a tender procedure; 
- There must be transparency, with regard to responsible public authorities, of the 
Single Buyer's long term system planning to verify whether his actions, especially 
the refusal to  purchase externally contracted electricity, are justified; 
- Finally, in  order to ensure that the decisions of import/export are taken  QY  the 
network without considering its own industrial-interests, an unbundling of  accounts . 
will  be  insufficient and  an  unbundling  of management  will  be  needed.  The 
cumulation  within  the  Single  Buyer  of various  powers  and  responsabilities_ 
increases the risks of distortion and discrimination and, therefore, makes it also 
necessary to ensure a full unbundling of management. 
V.  DIRECT LINES 
38.  In a TPA system, direct lines are seen as an alternative to the use of the integrated 
network. Any producer is,  therefore, authorised, subject to general conditions, to 
build a direct line to a consumer and reversely. In a Single Buyer system direct lines 
· are seen as an exception to the principle that all electricity consumed in the territory 
shall transit through the integrated ·network.  However, the Single Buyer proposal 
accepts that direct lines can be used for the purposes of eligible consumers and 
some other predefined producers. Under the Single Buyer as proposed direct lines 
21 are, therefore, authorised for export purposes and for autoproducers to s~pply  their 
'  .  .  .  .  .  . 
own premises. 
Finally, one must be aware that  w~atever  the system, environmental constraints will 
limit the possibility t~ build new li'nes  Even if there is an obligation on the ·single 
. Buyer to buy  back  imported  electricity  proposed  by  an  eligible  consume~,  ·this 
obligation is  not absolute since lack of capacity or public security may lead. to a 
.  -
·refusal.  The possibility to use a direct line is therefore necessary also in a  Single 
Buyer system.  In  the Single Buyer System all  eligible _consumers  shall  have the 
freedom to construct and  lJse  d~rect lines for transactions with external producers 
and domestic-independent producers (and vice versa for producers to supply eligible 
c-onsumers) _within  the framework of para.? of the- draft modified=Directive. 
VI.  COMPETITION AND INVESTMENTS 
- -
39.  In both the negotiated TPA as-well as in the Single Buyer system-a change will take 
place in the structure of competition of the market. lhe new competition conditions 
- '  .  - ( 
could -bring  along  the. danger -that  tbe  former  winners _of  competition  under 
·  ....  \ 
yesterday's rules might no longer be the new winners under tomorrow's rules. This 
.  .  . 
entails that there may be a problem for investments which.have been made under 
- _the  rules of the past; they may become_ hOfl-economic·or stranded.-
40.  The. possibility of stranded  investments,  as  a consequence  of a  change  in  the 
competition rules, are not a problem particular to the  el~ctricity industry. The same 
has happened in many sectors of the'economy which have undergone a process 
of change and liberalisation. Energy, as part ofthe internal market, is in this respect 
no ·exception. 
41 .. However, the investment costs in-the energy  s~ctor and the environmental costs-
linked  'to  the  construction  of new  yapacities  could  justify  cautious  rules  for  a 
transiti_?n period.  Whatever the choice for access to the system might  be, 'there is 
22 the risk that export will be realised on short term marginal cost basis not reflecting 
real costs of production which would need to be borne by domestic consumers. 
42.  The Commission's proposal on negotiated TPA as well as the Single Buyer proposal 
offer the possibility to apply a tender procedure for new production capacities which 
would not expose existing generation facilities to competition. Finally, it needs to be 
underlined that the change of  competition rules will only be a temporary problem to. 
which electricity companies will have adapted themselves after a period of  transition. 
- VII  .. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
43.  The purpose of  the Commission's proposal is to give effect to the freedom of trade 
in electricity and of  establishment in the European electricity market in accordance 
with art. 30- 37, 57, 66 and 100 A  of the Treaty.  The question is then to be sure 
that the introduction of  the-Single Buyer system will not undermine these provisions 
of the Treaty. 
The Commission's proposal lays down rules aimed at preventing discrimination in 
the delivery of  authorisations, in the management of  public tenders, in the treatment 
· of access negotiation to networks with a view to establishing the internal market in 
electricity.  The Single Buyer system should provide the same level of protection. 
A.  Freed~m  of exchanges in electricity 
44.  The objective of the negotiated TPA-proposal is to open up the eleCtricity market 
progressively,  and  in  a  first  transitional  phase  to  restrict  the  use  of  the 
interconnected network to a limited number of actors being most able to make ·use 
of it.  Withjn  this  gradual  approach  experience  will  be  acquired  by  the  system 
· operator to fully maintain security of supply. Experience will also show whether the 
number of users of the interconnected system can  be enlarged in a consecutive 
23 stage. The restrictions of access to t~einterconnected system ther~fore seem to be 
justified because of system  s~curity reasons. 
45.  According  to art  ..  37  any body through which  a Member State, in  law or  in  fact,-
. _  eith~r  directily or indirectly, supervises, determines·  o-r appreciably influ.ences imports 
or exports· between  ~ember  States shail have to be adjusted. 
46.  ~In 'the  negotiated third  party access,  (lS well  as  in  the~ Single Buyer system,  the 
network  operator  remains·  a -natural  monopoly  or  holds·  to  some  extent  a 
monopolistic position,· supervising  imports/exp-orts  between Member States.  The 
· _question  is to know· if in  the case of Single Buyer, the network-operator -will. have 
more possibilities to ·influence exchanges  betw~en Member States. 
- The imports will be, in both cases, at the consumer's initiative and the conditions 
ofneg·o~iations.with the producer will be the same. _No administrative formalities 
sh_ould  affect imports and exports; . 
- If the single buyer is the owner of all the. electricity in the network - which is not 
· the case in the other system- it does not have the· exclusive right to negotiate 
.  .  . 
import contracts arid has the obligation to accept the electricity contracted  with 
produce~s  from an other Member  State·~ or  area -subject to the same criteria as 
. in  Commission's proposal; 
47.  On the contrary, the singl~ buyer has all the characteristics of a monopoly for the 
domestic producers which have the possibility to sell directly to domestic consumers · 
'  - -
only in" limited cases (autoproducers selling electricity into company, groups). 
24 48.  The Court has laid down
2
,  that the existence of a monopoly enjoying  exclusive 
import rights constitutes a discrimination not only vis a vis Community .exporters 
based in other Member States but also in  relation to users based in the Member 
State concerned. In the above r:nentioned case,  it is important to underline that all 
production monopolies enjoyed exclusive import rights, thus the Court laid down the 
rule that every national monopoly of a commercial character must be adjusted so 
as to eliminate the exclusive right to import from other Member States. 
49.  Articles 30 and 34 prohibit quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and. all 
measures having equivalent effect. 
The Court has in  particular stated that "rules or practices which result in imports 
being channelled in such a way that only certain traders can effect these imports, 
whereas  others  are  prevented  from  doing  so  are  contrary  to  article  ~0"
3 .  It  is 
obvious  that  the  regime  envisaged  in  the  Single  Buyer  system  constitutes  a 
measure having equivalent effe_ct to a quantitative restriction on imports with regard 
to eligible consumers;. they are excluded from direct imports as they always remain 
clients of the grid.  The question is then whether this restriction can be justified by 
art. 36 under the heading "public security", in terms of security of supply. In relation 
to electricity, security of supply cim mean 
- security of supply of fuels for electricity generation, 
- availability of generating capacity sufficient to meet demand, or 
-security of the transmission system. 
If,  therefore, security of supply can justify restrictive measures under the heading 
of article 36,  it still remains necessary that these measures are proportional to the 
objective.  It appears justified that a State ensures that its degree of dependence 
does not weaken its own electricity production in an unacceptable manner and puts 
· into place  an  organisation  of the seetor which  allows for a management of the 
2  Manghera case C-347/88 ECR 1990 p.  1-4774 
3  Case 104/75 De Peijper ECR 1976, p.  613. 
25 ' 
production capacity, while taking account of the duration of the amortisation of the  · 
investments.  -Based on this,  the organisation of a Single Buyer charged with 'the' 
.  .  ' 
management oflong~term  planning equid constitute an appropriate instrument, if  the 
modalities of the. functioning of this organisation are themselves proportional to the 
objective. 
Besides taking account of  the central rol~ played bythe Single Buyer in the system, 
it shall have to acceptthe ne~_~ssary flexibility for the .free trade in electricity. The 
Commission, therefore, considers that the Single Buyer system will not see its goals 
put into jeopardy if the  long-term  planning  provides  the  possibility 'of short-term 
inworts and  of a  coexistence of the  authorisation  and  tendering  procedures  for 
.  .  - '. 
independent producers.  The  Commission should  be  able to  verify the long-term 
planning, as it will also verify the definition ·of the public service obligations which 
.  .  ~  . 
also justifY exceptions to  access to  the  network under the system-of negotiated' 
TPA.. 
50. · Under art.  58,  the right of establishment has to· be_  recognised  for all  companies 
incorporated in a Member State, without discrimination. The same conditions for the 
. creation  of power generation  by  a company  located  in  one  Member State,  will 
prevail for investors coming  from  other  Member States  ,·whateyer  is  the  system 
chosen. The differences in 'the right of establishment exercise will depend on  the 
modalities  chosen  for  constructing  new  production  capacities  _- as  in  the 
• Commission's proposal - and not on the  network~  acGess  modalities. 
B. ·  Transparency rules 
51.  The  Single  Buyer will  be  subject  - as  the  network  operator. - to  the  rules· on 
competition continued in  articles 85 to 90 of  the EC Treaty. The ·precondition for the 
.  . 
·- application of  these provisions are transparent rules permitting control of behaviour: 
The control authorities should have an  equal access to the reasons, for instance, 
for the refusal of a Import contract.  The._ responsibilities of the Single Buyer· cannot 
· be mixed wit.h  public authorities'  ~esponsabilities in  public tenders. 
26 Part  II  Parallel  authorisation of certain types of ·power plants in 
Member States which opt for a -tender-ing  procedure. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
52·.  The Commission has also been invited by the Council to study whether':in Member 
i 
States,  which  would  opt  for  a  tendering  system  as  regards  new  production 
capacities,  a  parallel  authorisation  procedure  would  need.  to  exist  for  certain 
. ·qualified types of  electricity production.  The follo'Ying categories of new production 
,  installations have been mentioned by the Council : 
power plants for export purposes; 
autoproducers; 
independent power producers; 
power plants producing on the basis of renewable energies, waste or combined 
heat and power. 
53.  The Commission proposed in article 5 (3) of its modified draft Directive concerning 
common rules for.the internal electricity market (COM (93) 643) that all independent 
producers as well as all autoproducers  should have the right to  be authorised in 
parallel to the call for tender prpcedure. 
54.  The following  chapters will  address the  possible combinations of tendering  and 
authorisation systems with either negotiated TPA or Single Buyer structures; it will 
also address the  arguments for the  need  of parallel authorisations in  tendering 
systems. as well as the possibilities of increasing competitive forces at the level of 
production  via  the  combination  of elements  contained  in  the  tendering  and 
authorisation. procedures. 
27 
··.';: II.  AUTHORISATION AND TENDER PROCEDURES-
:  .  .  . 
55.  , In theory the following four organisational structures could  be  made available for 
.  . 
'  -
the use of Member States : 
-
authorjsation.procedure ·liriked with the Single Buyer system; 
~erder~ng procedure linked with the Single Buyer  system;  . 
authorisation procedure linked with the negotiated TPA-system; 
~~ndering procedure linked with the negotiated  TPA-syst~m. 
56.  .It is  obvious that the two polar  c~ses of authorisations and, negotiated TPA and 
calls  for  tender· and  Single  Buyer  are,  from  a  theoretical  point  of view,  the 
organisational  structures  being  most  likely to  either  achieve  the  objectives  of 
- .  .  .  ::.- - ..- . 
intro~t,Jcing market ·forces  into the  electricity system or to give  priority to central 
·planning  and  the  fulfilment  of public  service  obligations.  The  combination  of 
...  .  .  "  .  .  . 
.  - . 
.  authorisation procedures and Single Buyer system would try to  combine the free 
- - .·  . 
right of establishment with  a central  purchase and  sales  system.  This  system 
·- .  --
approach is reflectedJorexample in pool market organisations, however,with some 
differing system specific elements. The combination of tendering procedures and 
negotiated  TPA would  introduce  a  certain  choice  to  select  new  production 
capacities  without  giving  the~e  new  capacities  fully  secure· outlets  for  their 
- - -, 
production.  The  position  of indepedent  producers,  autoproducers  and  RWC-
- producers (Renew~bles, Waste, CHP) u~der  thes~ system combinations would be 
as follows.· 
. 57.  Negotiated TPA with tendering 
The independent Producer seems to be  in  a good ,position,  because  he. could 
draw profit from all advantages of a TPA ~ystem without being bothered by all the 
restrictions the regulator  may impose by the tendering procedu_re.  Of coursE!,  the 
regulator can influence this development by imposing a particular fuel (e.g. coal), 
- but only in a·limited manner.  The conclusion is that a TPA system combined with· 
tendering may favour IPP's operating under the parallel authorisatio_n  procedure. 
· It  must,. however,  be  underlined  that  the  combination  of TPA  and  tende!ing 
28 procedure is .rather hypothetical since tendering  always implies the existence of 
long-term sl!lpply ·contracts with the system. 
Auto-Prodl!lcersare covered;by Article 2~ (-1 )ihlliith respect-.to the network access, 
and by Ar.:ticle  13 (4)  in  connection with-the Collncil Recommendation·88/611  as 
,regards 'tlae corresponding .national legislation:(if 'RWC-based, see .below}: 
·  RWC..;Protlucers may ·be  entitled  to  draw full  profit  fr<;>m  the  virtually  unlimited 
_  preferenoe\to.begiventothem atdispatch,.aslaid inArticle 13 (4)  ofthe'"Medified 
.Proposal" sl!il!?ject ·however of transposition into national law. 
58.  Negotiated TPAwith licensing procedure 
In this case,  lndependentPr.oducers would be on the same footing as all  other 
generators. 
Auto-producersand RWC-producerswot.ild be in·a similar position as described· 
under par~graph  '57. 
59.  Single Buyer with tendering procedure 
Export  Producers,  . being . independent  producers,  are  not  allowed  to  sell 
electricity within ·the  Si("lgle  Buyer's area,  but may export.  This  implies for the 
generator the need .of : 
a  long.: term .(t5 years ·or more) supply contract with a foreign consumer; 
·1ong-:term  transmission  contracts  with  the  national  and  foreign  network 
operator. 
There are some doubts whether the network operators are in  a position (or willing) 
to conclude such -long-term transmission contracts, due to the known difficulties of 
building newtransmission'lines and to the growiqg saturation of the existing ones. 
29 
/ Auto-producers and  RWC-produc~rs  wouid be  in a similar  -~osition as above. 
Othe_r  Independent Power Producers, not producing  for  export purposes,  but 
interested in  producing for the market in the Single Buyer area, will have to make . 
bids in the tendering procedure and will have to win the call for tender.  There is  .  .  . 
.  no po,ssibility for these iridepend~nt producers to acquire an authorisation, or to sell 
their .electricity to  consumers.  All their. transactions will  have to run  through the 
tendering prcedure arid _the  Single Buyer system.  _ 
60.  Single Buyer.with licensing procedure 
This, again, is a ~ighly hypothetical case, since tne philosophy of the Single Buyer. 
system is based·on.detailed cehtralplanning, which would become impossible if the 
.  Single Buyer would  be. obliged to  purchase  the  electricity of a great number of · 
· independe-nt power stations. In particular, this wouldreqlJire a thorough re-definition 
of the system as presented by France, 
In  any ·.case,  a  general  licensing  system  would  introduce  the  same  rights  and . 
"  . 
obligations for Independent Power Producers and all other. generators. 
The protection scheme for auto-producers and RWC-producers would be similar a~r 
described above. 
'  .  . 
Ill.  THE NEED FOR PARALLEL AUTHORISATIONS WITHIN TENDER SYSTEMS 
.61.  It has already been shown in part one of this working paper that calls for tender for 
new  production  capacities 'are a  competitive' tool  within  a  process  of  central 
'  ' 
pl~nning to  balance  expected  additional  electricity  demand  with  supply.  The 
initiative 'to  allow 'new.  production  installations  in·  the  system  or  to  open  .the 
possibility of long term contracts with external suppliers is therefore taken by the · 
respective planning authorities and not by the electricity producers. 
.  '  ,  . 
30 62.  It has been argued recently that there should be no authorisation in parallel to the 
tender system  as  this  would  complicate  the  planning function  as  well  as  other 
obligations of. the Single Buyer. However, it is the conviction of  the Commission that 
no tender procedure is able to reflect properly all production capacity requirements· 
existing in the electricity market and that, therefore, every tender procedure needs' 
.  . 
to  be· complemented  by  a  parallel  authorisation  procedure.  This  basic  fact  is  ' 
accepted in both, the negotiated TPA and the Single Buyer proposal. The crucial 
question, however, is the extent of authorisations required or justified in parallel to 
the tender procedure. 
63.  Industrial Auto-Producers are normally independent producers generating electricity. 
for their own use, but selling surplus electricity to the system and buying peak or 
stand-by electricity from  the  system.  The capacity  requirements  of these  auto-
producers are established on the basis of individual company needs which are not 
known to central planning authorities. By definition the launching of call for tenders 
to  enlarge  production  capacities  for  the  public  demand  is  not  suited  to  cover 
individual  demand  which  shall  not  be  satisfied via  the  integrated  transmission 
system. Therefore, .autoproducers require parallel authorisations. 
64  ... RWC-Producers  are  normally  independent  producers  or  auto-producers  (see 
·arguments above), but being  faced  with  particular problems due to the primary 
energies  (renewables,  waste)  or  th.e  technology  used  (CHP).  In  theory  these 
producers could be included into tender procedures for new capacities as long as 
they are not auto-producers. However,  as these producers suffer from very high 
production costs (with the exception of hydroelectricity) they would not be able to 
survive in  a tendering climate of sharp competition. 
65.  CHP  generators  are  in  a  somewhat  different situation.  They  usually have the 
highest overall efficiency and  should  in  principle be  economic and  competitive. 
However they h,ave to compete in two markets, i.e. electricity and heat. In no case 
they  can  afford  to  loose  one  of these  outlets  as  this  would  erode ·their whole 
economic base. An exclusion from competitive tendering, therefore, seems to be 
31_ justified. 
66.·  It could be ar9ued that specific tend~rs  for RWC-producers 9nly could be organised 
to overcome these economic disadvantages.  However, this appi-oach  wot,~ld not 
chang~ the. fac~ that fo.r the construction  of new .capacities  producers based on 
RWC would have to wait for a centrai  plahriin~ initiative whereas for the political 
support of these  environro.entally benign prod-uction  facilities- it  would he more 
!  - .  .  .  .  .  '  ._ 
efficient not to have.thi~ restriction but to allow at any-time the construction of such 
faciliti~s which could be suppo"rted  -in' an  appropriate  ma~ner. 
. 67.  - Export Producers are independent producers which gen_erate electriCity-for export 
ptirpa,ses only. Centraf  planning and tendering would nev,er be in· a po$itiori to cover 
thes~  ca~acities  a~ they would.not-~ffect  the.internareiectricity demand an-q supply . 
balanc~  of  the system. As regards the electricity producers mentioned under para 
· 63, 64 and 67 both the negotiated TPA and·the Sing  I~ B1,1yer proposal  ~ccept the. 
existanc~ of  ~arallel ?Uthorisations.  However:  there' is  no  such  agreemeot as 
- regards the· treatment of independent producer.s. 
68.  Other  Independent  Producers  are  generators  not  assurin~ - any  electricity . 
transmission and distribution fuhcti~ns inside the area of the system- operator (Art  . 
. _2  (20)  ofth~ draft ·modified  Directive):· This means  t~at also '-verticaHy  integrated 
utilities planning tq establish production installations in the area ofother integrated-.  .  .  .  '  ~  .  .  --. 
electricity systems· w~uld be reg-arded  to  be  ind-ependent producers. The above.-
.  .  .  ' 
definition, ~alid for parallel authorisations, has been established-for negotiated TPA  .  .  -
.  .  - . , 
· systems  and  it  needs  t9 ·be discusseq  whether  this  definition  would  also  be 
appropriate :for tendering systems linked with a si·ngle Buyer.  · 
•  '  I  I  " 
'./ 
69.  The  parallel  authorisation· ofthese  independent  producers  _including  vertically 
-integr_ated  ~lectticity companies  outside  the  system ·area  could  jeopardise. the_. 
•  ,,  '  •  '  •  •  •  ~  •  '•  ••  •  J  I 
centrally planned demand and supply balance. _Within a Single Buyer system these -
independent_ ·producers would  have no secured outlets and  could only sell to ttie  -
·Single Buyer. The Single Buyer would only purchase this electricity after all  the 
32 obligations based on  long-term supply contracts 'have been met.  It could be said 
that .it  is  ha.rdly  imaginable that .independent producers would  request a parallel · 
authorisation if no appropriate sales possibilities exist. 
70.  On the other hand it had been shown under P':lrt I that the tendering procedure in 
.  competition terms is mo.re restrictive than the authorisation procedure and that an 
additional opening could.overcome this imbalance. However, an opening in favour' 
'  ' 
. of  some clearly defined other independent producers w~uld  only make sense if  they 
. could compete directly for eligible consumers inside the system. If these conditions 
. could be met, the parallel authorisation of independent producers would be a tool 
to  increase the competitive environment of the tendering/Single Buyer system. 
This  would  then  have  to  imply ·that  independent  producers  can  establish 
themselves within the Single Buyer system through parallel authorisation, and that. 
these independent producers should be able to  enter into contracts with. eligible 
consumers within the Single Buyer system, along the lines as foreseen for imports . 
_from· external producers.  These two measures would  redress the  imbalance in 
competition under a tendering regime,  and would provide independent producers 
with the possibility of finding an outlet for their sales within the system. 
71.  Such  eligible.· consumers  could  for .  example  be  electricity  intensive  industrial 
consumers,  which  have already the possibility to find  cheap electricity supplies 
outside the system.  However,  some sort of restrictive definition  for  independent 
producers seems to be necessary,  so as  not to totally disrupt the  Single Buyer 
system  with  new  power  plants  of very  high  capacity  (1000  MW for  example). 
Therefore, the introduction of a quantitative capacity threshold may be required and 
appropriate to ensure overall system stability. 
IV.  PARALLEL AUTHORISATIONS FOR PRODUCERS 
72.  It  is  clear that in  all  systems which  follow  a  tendering. procedure  a  nu·mber  of 
33 . specific types ofne\~ielectricity production will  n~ed to be authorised in  pa~all~-! to 
.  .  . 
the_  t~nder procedure_,  because they  cannot  be ·satisfactorily  dealt with  by <the  .  .  .  '  . 
'  . 
-~tendering procedure. 
73.  Autoproducers, which produce to meet their own consumption· requirements, ~an  not· 
be·  satisfied  through  a :call  for. tender  and will,  therefore,  re,quire  _a  paraller 
authorisation: · 
74 ..  RWC-produ'cers  (Renewables,  Waste,  CHP)  could  in  theory  be  included.  in 
·tendering' procedures,  but this wot,Jid ··not  sufficiently satisfY the  political  need to 
.  $Up port these emiironme.ntally benign production facilities. Therefore, to meet this 
dema~d  RWC-produ'c'~rs'~iil also  r~quire a  parallel authoris.at'ion:  ' 
75~ ·_ Expor:t producers, becau~_e  they are generating exclusively for foreign markets, cari 
)  •.  .  .  .  .  .  .  '  .  ..._  . 
not  be covered by a central planning' and tendering procedure aild, therefore, will 
- .  .  .  ~  '  ·-.  .  - .  . 
al~o require a· para.llel authorisation. 
76 .. Independent producers could risk jeopardisin-g the centrally planned demand and 
'  .  '  .  .  .  .  .  ·-
supply balance in. all  systems following the tendering procedure. However, it has  -_ 
bee'n shown that the tender procedure itself in competition terms is more restrictive 
. _ than  the  authorisation  procedure.  An. additional  opening.· by  means  of parallel 
authorisations for independent produc~rs  could overcome-this imbalance. As such;_ 
as$uming the conditio~s  ~are met that independent produc~rs  cou-ld compete ins-ide  .  .  .  .  . 
' the  system  for .  eligible' consumers,  the  parallel  authorisation  of independent . 
-~  .  '  .  .  .  ·• 
producers could be used  as-~ tool to strengthen the competitive environment of the. 
tendering/Single Buyer system~ _However,  to avoid the.total.destabilisation ·at th_e 
•  •  t  •  '  ~  •  •  •  •  • •  •  • 
Single Buy~r system by nevv power plants of very high capacities, a transparent . 
definition.  for  indep-endent  pr~ducers  must  be.  introduced,- oA,--;the  basis  of 
'  . 
quantitati~e capaCity thresholds  . 
..  ) 
34 CONCLUSIONS 
A.  Reciprocity 
77  .. The Singl~ Buyer system, as proposed in  its present form, cannot be considered 
as being equivalent to the Commission's proposal of negotiated Third Party Access,. 
nor  does  it  provide  for  reciprocity,·  as  it  falls  short  of what  is  desirable  and· 
achievable from the··competition  point of view.  A high degree of reciprocity can 
only be··assured between the systems if  certain basic adaptations are applied to the· 
present SB-model. 
It is  clear, therefore,  that at the extremes,  two types of market organisation,  i~ 
which  those opting  for the  Commission's TPA system  follow  the authorisation 
.  . 
procedure, while those. opting~  for the Single Buyer system.· fotiow the tendering 
procedure, are so different that they·cannot provide an equivalent degree of market 
access,  nor· reciprocity between the systems.  It  is  true also that in  such  a case . 
there is a risk·of unilateralliberalisation by some Member Stat~s, while others stay 
behind. 
From the point ofview·ofthe Commission this is a valid argument if one compares 
the proposal of the Commission for TPA with  the  French proposal for a Single 
Buyer system.  However,  the.  conclusions  of this  paper attempt  to  identify  the 
outlines of a modified Single Buyer system, which would give stronger guarantees 
for reciprocity and non-discrimination, and for equivalent economic results.  To be 
able to reach this conclusi?n differer:1t  basic adaptations need to be made which 
aim at increasing· transparency and at further enlarging the possibility of access to 
the market (mainly as far as. the establishment of  electricity producers is concerned) 
and  of exchanges both within  and  outside the system (between  producers and 
·eligible consumers). 
· If these adaptations of the  Single Buyer could  be preserved, this  model can be 
· seen as ensu·ring a similar opening of electricity markets compared to negotiated 
35 · TPA.  Both  systems ·must  be  based on.  a common. and  transp-arent  defi~iti~n of 
eligible cqm~umers  .(ie.  large_ inqus~rial  consumer~ and distributors). The· opening. 
of the m'arket is  realised via the cove;age  ~of the·se eligible consumers  .. 
...  .  - ' 
.  .  .  .  . 
. 78.  T~  ensure a  maximum of  reciprodty~and compatibility with the Treaty; the followin.g 
. modalities have to be met :. 
-..;  .. 
Degree of consumer choice for eligible consu·mers  -:  ln. case of  the Single 
Buyer  system  eligible  consu.mers  should  have  the  freedom. to ·contract· 
.el~ct~icity supplies with external prod_ucers under the same conditions as with 
- domestic independent electricity  p~oducers  . 
. '\  .  . 
-Imports  and  exports  of electricity ':. Both  systems  could  generate  directly 
c.omparable  and  acceptable· results  if the  import  regime  under  the Single. 
Buyer model is governed by an' obligation of  the Single Buyer to' buy unlimi!ed 
.  quantities· of  imported  electricity· under  certain  'objective  conditions,  by 
transpar~ncy . of 'tariffs- to  . use  the . transmission . system  and  thereby 
transparency 9f prices to-b~ paid  ~y· the Single Buyer for imported electricity. 
· Furt~erme5re, . electricity  imports  !?hould . only·  be  subject. to  objectiv:e  and 
jystified ~onditions (i.e.  li;lck of interconneCted capacity or for· public secority 
reasons). 
... ___  . 
Transparency  and  distortion of. competition  In  order .to ensure  that  the 
. - principles of objectivity, transparency and non-discriminations· are respected 
.  - .  .  '  .,  . 
·  to guarantee that co-mpetition  is not _distorted,  to avoid  the  risk  -of. potential·  .  .  '  .  .  .  '• 
.. discrimination,  'andto ?Chieve  neutral'~nd independent treatment, the Single 
.  _:Buyer .. where part of an integrated- undertaking, should be fully unbundled in. 
ter~s of a. separation of-management and  of'inform~Jion flows :between' its 
differ~nt activities, especi-ally in  ter~s·  of:pr~duction and supply. 
Competition at the  level of production  : Tendering procedures for new and 
additional  production  capaei~ies, which  are  more  restrictive  in  competition 
36 terms than authorisation systems, should only be organised and decided by ... 
public authorities or other independent  entities appointed for- this purpose.  . .  _  :,; 
Parallel. authorisations of Independent Rroducers: To redr,ess the imbalance 
between authorisation and tender procedures; independent producers should, · 
even  under·  tendering. systems,·  benefit· from  parallel; authorisations  to 
strengthen  competitive-· forces.  A  transparent  definition  for  independent  ., 
producers  in  Single  Buyer  systems  must· be  introduced·, ·on ·the ·basis  of 
quantitative capacity thresholds. In addition, aLJtoproducers; export-producers 
...  and ,Hwc· producers  (Renewable,  Waste,  CHP)  should also  benefiLfrom ·  ... 
parallel authorisations to fulfil the  need for. their specific type  of production 
capacity. 
.  - Direct lines: In the Single Buyer system aU  eligible consumers shall have the  ... 
freedom  to  construct  and  use  direct  lines  for  transactions  with  external  .... 
-1  ••• 
producers and domestic independent producers (and vice versa for producers  ., 
to  supply  eligible  consumers)· within  the  framework  of Art.?  of. the  draft · 
modified Directive. 
79.  The  a_bove  conditions apply  specifically to  the .Single  Buyer,  within  the Single 
·Buyer system,  however,  a number of these conditions  could  also apply  to  all 
integrated undertakings in  both the Single Buyer and the TPA system. It is clear 
that in both systems an unbundling of management i_n  integrated  utilities would 
improve competitive forces. 
B.  Compatibility with the Treaty 
80.  As ceg~rd.s the simultaneous introduction of both systems.and their compatibility 
with the Treaty, it can be concluded that the SB system, as provided' in its present  · , 
form with its internal monopoly structure, is  to  be/ considered  as  a measure of 
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports within the sense of article· 
37 30 of the EC Treaty.  Furthermore, it should not contain obstacles to the freedom 
of establishment goi11g  beyond constraints ·imposed by public security. ·  .. 
The present proposal would result in all supplies and production being channeled  .  .  . 
.  .  .  .  '' 
· ·de  f~cto through the Single Buyer.  A system which char:mels imports and exports 
through an .intermediary is contrary to the principle of free movement of goods. 
Moreover,  the  unmodified  Single  Buyer  could  be  more  prone  to  the  risk  of 
predatory pricing. than  the negotiated TPA system by virtue of the structure of 
.  .  . 
incentives  ~nd  ·obligations inherent in the  system~ Exclusive r!ghts  resulting  in 
.  . 
absolute· control qver ·imports,  transmission  and  distribution  are  prima  facie 
.  ' 
contrary to the basic Community-principle offree movement and competition and 
cannot be automatically justified on  public services grounds. 
Security  of supply .reasons do not automatically justify an  exemption based on 
.  .  .  .  - .  .  \ 
"public security" pr_ovided in article 36 of the Treaty.  There is no evidence in the 
case law ~f the Court leading to an  automatic suspension of the Treaty rules on 
free movement and competition. As the negotiated TPA-system shows, security 
ot' supply and pubiic service obligations~  can also be met in a system which is less 
restrictive to competition. 
It is obvious that according to the respective security of supply situations Member 
States.  organise  electricity· markets  according  tp  their  different  needs.  An 
acceptable balance must be reached  between the necessity of completing  the 
internal market and the legitimate preoccupations of. security of supply. The Single 
Buyer system wants to provide an organisation of the electricity market based on 
.  .  . 
long term system planning aiming at securing ·supply with a central management 
of production, transport and di,stributiori.  Nevertheless,  without affecting this long 
term planning approach, adaptations of the Single Buyer .system -are necessary 
in  order to make it  ~ompatible with the Treaty. 
38. C.  Integration of the Market 
81.  Is a coexistence of two systems compatible-with the process of integration in 
electricity  markets?  Will  there  be  indentifiable  progress  towards  an  internal 
electricity market based on two systems, as compared to the present situation? 
Certainly a parallel coexistence of two systems creates problems in establishing 
an  internal  electricity  market. as  integration  does  not  follow  a  harmonised 
approach~ However, the Commission's proposal itself is part of a second phase 
of  transition towards ·liberalised energy markets, in which the Commission wants 
.·Member States to gain experience in stronger liberalisation and competition.  It 
is  important that aAnual  reporting  of the  experience gained  and  of progress 
towards liberalisation is  made.  The Commission will  subsequently assess the · 
situation and  draft after four years a report on this experience.  If from a market 
integration point of view this experience in liberalisation - and competition - is not 
ideal, then this will be rectified in a third and final phase of legislative activity with 
the aim of  fully completing the:! internal market in all sectors of the Member States' 
economies. 
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cONCLUSIONS 
AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT "AND COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
CONCERNIN.G COMMON RULES FoR THE INTERNAL ~  IN ELECTRICITY . 
"After the submission of the amended p~oposals for Directives on common rules for the 
int~rnar market for electricity and natural gas by the  .Commission in response to the 
position of the European Parliamem and the conclusions ·of the Council on 
30 November 1992  .the Councii has concluded th.e following: 
. 1;  The Council confirms the necessity of completing.the internal energy market. taking 
into consideration the differeri:r situations in  Member States and the basic principles 
identified in  ~he.Col!ncil Conclusions of 30 November 1992.  It is therefore essential 
to work towards se'ci.ire~ open, transparent, efficier:at, competitive and environmentally 
acceptable electricity  ~1;1d gas m~rkets, taking into ·accOunt the energy objectives of 
rational use of energy a~d development of renewable and indigenous energy sources.  '  .  - .. - - .  ~  . 
2.  The.·Council recognizesithat the energy situ.ation in-Member States, and in particular 
their different levels of ~her9)' security of supply;._have led tci different structu"res in 
the orgariization of the sector.  The Council is therefore convinced that the completion 
.  . 
of the internal electricity and gas markets requires flexible solutions, which, however, 
muSt be applied in the spirit ot·reciprocity between Member States and lead to 
equivalent and non-discriminatory opening of markfil~·· . 
3.  The Council recognizes the factthat the deliberations are first concentrating on the 
electricity market~  In this connection, "five keytopics with regard to the electricity · 
market were identified under the Greek. Presidency._ Agreement has to a  large degree 
now been reached on four of these topics, while there is· the need for additional 
discussion and clarification with rega~d to market liber~lization in  areas extending ·/·• 
/ 
.  .  .  .  .  . 
. beyond the production sector and to other aspects of. the Directive, for -instanca that 
.  ..  .  ....:..:-....  .  .  .  . 
of harmonization and .taking into account that eac;;h ot'these five  key topics should 
~  .  .  .  .  .  . 
· . represent part of an overall agreed solution. 
"'  .:.  . 
4.  There is agreement in principle on the following themes· regarding the electricity  .  .  ·.  .  "  .  .. 
sector: 
.  -
(a)  As regards the. production of electricity and with the goal of achieving 
(b) 
competition within the branch, Member States should be given the right to 
choose .between authorization and/or tender procedures for new production 
capacity.  Authorization and tender procedures shall take place according to 
objective and non-di$criminatory  criteria~ ,For monitoring the organization and 
· execution of the tender procedure, Member States shall.appoint an independent 
public or private body; the treatment of certain types of power product:ic;m to· be 
authorized in  parallef  to tender procedures needs further an~iysis.~ 
.  . 
Ver:tically integrated companies shall keep on a comparable basis separate 
accounts for the 'aCtivities of production. transmission and distribution, in a way 
which will avoid discrimination and cross subsidies and will ensure undistorted 
competition.  T'99uarantee adequate transparency, these.separate accounts must 
be accessible to the independent entities defined by the Member States~ at well 
as to qispute setti:Tent authorities as provided for in. the proposed Directive. 
'  ' 
({;:)  . The provisions of  the Directive concerning the network .oe_erator are to be Umi~ed 
to those necessary to ensure the implementation of the Internal Electricity Market 
in  a  no~-bureaucratic' way.  .  . 
.  .  .  '  .·  . r--··-
(d)  l.nsofar as Member States impose public service obligations _on  undertakin9§ in the· 
electricity sector in the general economic interest, - which may include, for  · 
instance, services in the fields of environment and 'security of supply _.these  . 
. must be clearly defined, transparent~ non-cliscrimin~tory  and monitorable.  They 
·shall be publis~ed and· communicate~ to the.Commission.  ·The requirements of 
. Article 90{2) of :t;he  EC Treaty have. to. be respected': :  ·  ·  ·  -
..... · .. .. 
5.  Further discussion is necessaiy on how to open the markets beyond the area of electricity 
production, especially on the question of the possible·  sim~ltaneous introduction of a 
negotiated TPA and a so-called single-buyer system.  In this context, it is necessary to 
.  / 
verify that both approaches, in the spirit of reciprocity, lead to equivalent economic 
results and, therefore, to a directly comparable level in· the opening of markets and to a. 
directly comparable degree of access to electricity markets and that they conform with -
the provisions of the Treaty. 
Th~ c"ommissioo is called on to examine and .outline ·the anticipated consequences of the 
.  . 
side-by-'side application of both approach?s, in particular with .respect to the potential for 
competition and the impact on the various groups of suppliers and pur~hasers:  This 
analysis will also deal with the queStion whether in  Member States introducing a tender 
procedure, power plants producing for export, for autoproduction and independent  .  .  '::  -
production, as· well as power-plants based on CHP and renewable energies, should be 
p~rmitted  by authorization procedures - in parallel to the tender procedures - as welL 
This analysis will arso deal with the specific problems of opening the markets in  small and. 
very small eiectricity systems. 
6.  The Permanent Representatives Committee is requested to finalize work on the basis of 
the abovementioned principles so that a common P.osit~on ean-?e· formally adopted as 
s~on aspossible in the year 1S95. 
7.  FOur years after the exPiration of th~ deadline for enacting th~ .Oitective in  national 
legislation, the Commission shall submit a  report· on the exper~~nce ina  de and propose, 
depending on the outcome. such changes in the Directive or other initiatives as may be 
required to  better attain the goals outlined in paragraph 1.-
/f  II 
I  ) 
l.l  ) 